Health Information Exchange
Health information exchange is the movement of clinical information between organisations that do not share a system: a hospital and a district health office, a laboratory and a clinic, a private provider and a national registry.
"An HIE" refers to the whole apparatus — the technical infrastructure, the participation agreements, the governance body and the operating team. It is an institution more than a piece of software, and programmes that procure only the software discover this late.
What it has to solve
Regardless of architecture, four problems must be answered:
- Identity — is this the same person, facility and clinician on both sides? (registries)
- Discovery — where does information about this patient exist?
- Retrieval — how is it obtained, in what format, with what latency?
- Authorisation — is this requester permitted this data, for this purpose, with this patient's consent?
An architecture is largely determined by how it answers 2 and 3.
The three structural models
Centralised
A single repository holds the clinical data. Source systems push to it; queries are served from it.
EMR A ──┐
EMR B ──┼──push──▶ ┌────────────────────┐ ◀──query── Consumers
Lab ──┤ │ Shared health │
CHW ──┘ │ record (central) │
└────────────────────┘
| Strengths | Fast, predictable queries. Works when sources are offline. Enables population analytics directly. Simple to operate. |
| Weaknesses | Data duplication and staleness. Concentrated privacy risk and a single high-value target. Requires the legal basis for central storage. Sources may resist relinquishing custody. |
| Suits | Countries with clear central mandate; environments with unreliable connectivity at the edge; when analytics is a primary goal. |
Federated
Data stays with the source. A registry records where information exists; the exchange queries sources at read time and assembles the response.
┌──────────────┐
Query ───────────▶│ Record │ "who holds data on this patient?"
│ locator │
└──────┬───────┘
│ fan-out query
┌─────────────┼─────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
EMR A EMR B Lab
│ │ │
└─────────────┴─────────────┘
assembled response
| Strengths | Sources keep custody, which is often the only politically acceptable answer. No stale copies. Smaller central privacy footprint. |
| Weaknesses | Query latency is bounded by the slowest source. Every source must be online and highly available. Population analytics is hard. Debugging is distributed. |
| Suits | Multi-institution networks with strong data-custody norms; good connectivity; regulatory environments prohibiting central storage. |
Hybrid
The usual real answer. A central index and a curated summary set are held centrally; full records stay at the source and are fetched on demand.
Sources ──push summary──▶ ┌─────────────────────┐
│ Central: identity, │◀── fast queries
│ index, summary set │
└──────────┬──────────┘
│ on-demand fetch of detail
┌──────────┴──────────┐
▼ ▼
EMR A Lab
The summary set is typically the International Patient Summary shape: problems, medications, allergies, immunisations, key results. It is what a clinician needs in an unplanned encounter, and it is small enough to keep current.
| Strengths | Fast for the common case; custody preserved for the detail; resilient when a source is down (the summary still answers). |
| Weaknesses | Two mechanisms to build and operate. Requires deciding what belongs in the summary — a clinical governance question, not a technical one. |
| Suits | Most national architectures. |
See the full pattern write-up in centralised vs federated HIE.
Exchange styles
Orthogonal to the structural model: how information moves.
Document exchange
A whole, attested clinical document — discharge summary, referral letter — is
published and later retrieved. IHE XDS/XCA (or MHD over FHIR) provides the
registry/repository infrastructure; content is
CDA or a FHIR document Bundle.
Good for: referral and discharge, legal attestation, low-trust or low-bandwidth transport, offline transfer. Poor for: answering "what is this patient's current creatinine?" — you must find and open the right document.
API-based exchange
Query for the resources you need. FHIR REST is the dominant form.
Good for: targeted queries, apps, decision support, incremental adoption. Poor for: attestation, and situations where the source cannot host an API.
Event-based exchange
Sources publish events — admission, result available, notifiable diagnosis — and interested subscribers receive them.
Good for: surveillance, care coordination, keeping an index current, triggering workflow. Poor for: as the sole record of truth. Events are notifications; always pair with a reconciliation query. See event-driven interoperability.
Patient-mediated exchange
The patient carries or authorises access to their own record — a SMART on FHIR app, a QR-coded summary, a personal health record.
Good for: cross-border care, mobile populations, ecosystems with no legal basis for provider-to-provider sharing, and consent legitimacy. Poor for: emergencies where the patient cannot participate, and populations without devices or literacy to manage it.
Bulk exchange
Scheduled transfer of large volumes for analytics or migration — FHIR Bulk Data.
Good for: warehouses, quality measurement, research. Poor for: anything at the point of care.
Most ecosystems eventually use four of these five. The mistake is choosing one and forcing every use case through it.
Discovery patterns
| Pattern | How it finds data | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Registry-based | A record locator lists which sources hold data for a patient | The standard federated approach (IHE XCA, XDS registry) |
| Broadcast query | Ask every source | Simple; does not scale beyond a handful, and leaks the fact of the query |
| Central index | Central store knows what it holds | Fastest; requires central storage |
| Patient-provided | The patient names or authorises the sources | Strong consent story; incomplete by nature |
The record locator is itself sensitive. Knowing that a patient has records at an HIV clinic is a disclosure even if no clinical data is retrieved. Access to the locator needs the same controls as the data.
Design decisions to record
Each of these deserves an ADR:
- Structural model — centralised, federated, hybrid
- What the central summary set contains, and who decides
- Consent model — opt-in, opt-out, purpose-based — and break-glass
- Identity strategy and matching thresholds
- Standards and versions, with an upgrade policy
- Latency and availability targets, and edge behaviour when unmet
- Audit retention and who may query the audit log
- Onboarding and conformance requirements for participants
- Funding model for the shared components
- Exit — how a participant leaves and what happens to its data
Why they fail
Observed repeatedly, in roughly descending order of frequency:
- No legal basis for sharing, discovered after the build
- Identity was assumed — no registry, so records cannot be matched
- Built before there was a consumer — a write-only repository
- Terminology never mapped, so pooled data cannot be analysed
- No sustainable funding for the operating team after the grant ends
- Participation was voluntary with no incentive — the largest providers opted out
- The pilot's champion left
Note how few of these are technical.
References
- OpenHIE architecture — https://ohie.org/
- IHE IT Infrastructure profiles (XDS, XCA, PIX/PDQ, MHD) — https://www.ihe.net/
- HL7 FHIR — https://hl7.org/fhir/
- International Patient Summary IG — https://hl7.org/fhir/uv/ips/
- WHO Digital Health Platform Handbook — https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240013728